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Arrium: Is it ‘commercial reality’ to conclude that a company is solvent until it 
is ‘certain that it cannot pay’ its future debts?  
Mark Wellard, Senior Lecturer, UTS Law 
The recent judgment of Justice Ball of the NSW Supreme Court in a large case arising from the 
Arrium insolvency – Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd v Sparkes (No 3); Bank of 
Communications Co Ltd v Sparkes (No 2) (‘Arrium’)1 – addressed an issue often debated but rarely 
arising for judicial determination: to what degree of certainty (or uncertainty) must a court be 
satisfied to conclude that a company was solvent at a time when it had a large maturing debt 
payable in the future?  
 
The case involved a multitude of claims surrounding various representations made by the company 
and its authorised personnel in ‘drawdown’ notices that were provided by Arrium as preconditions 
to the extension of facilities by a variety of financiers (subsequently plaintiffs). One of those 
representations was that the company was solvent at the time of the relevant drawdown notice. The 
plaintiffs in one of the claims alleged that this representation was false because, at that time, the 
company was unable to pay its debts as they became due and payable; those debts included some 
$870 million of facilities due to mature in 18 months’ time (ie, 18 months subsequent to the 
drawdown notice containing the representation of solvency). 
 
A key issue in the case was whether or not the company was solvent at the date of the drawdown 
notice representation. The plaintiffs alleged that the company was insolvent at that time, which in 
turn sustained an allegation of personal liability on the part of the company officers responsible for 
the drawdown notices containing the representation of solvency. 
 
Therefore, the Court was required to conduct a ‘retrospective’ assessment of solvency as at a 
relevant ‘snapshot date’ (to borrow a term used by Justice Owen of the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia in the landmark Bell Group decision in 2008).2  
 
Ball J’s approach to assessing solvency in the context of future debts that will become payable 
 
In Arrium Justice Ball endorsed the proposition that a plaintiff does not discharge its onus of proving 
insolvency unless it proves that, as at the ‘snapshot date’, it is certain that the company could not 
pay its debts including large future maturing debt facilities. Ball J held that Arrium could not be said 
to be insolvent at the snapshot date because ‘there were a sufficient number of possibilities open to 
Arrium to deal with its bank debt’, including ‘the possibility of compromise’ with Arrium’s lenders 
and the expectation that ‘in some cases, banks may be prepared to accept less than 100 cents in the 
dollar because they accept that is the best way of maximising their returns on the debt that they are 
owed.’3 
 
The test (or approach) taken by Ball J in Arrium appears to depart from established authorities on 
the assessment of cash flow insolvency and plainly differs from the approach taken by Owen J in Bell 
Group to the ‘forward looking’ aspect of assessing insolvency under s 95A of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth).  
                                                          
1 Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd v Sparkes (No 3); Bank of Communications Co Ltd v Sparkes (No 2) 
[2021] NSWSC 1025. 
2 The Bell Group Ltd (ACN 008 666 993) (in liq) and Ors v Westpac Banking Corporation (ACN 007 457 141) and 
Ors (No 9) [2008] WASC 239. 
3 Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd v Sparkes (No 3); Bank of Communications Co Ltd v Sparkes (No 2) 
[2021] NSWSC 1025 at [298] per Ball J. 
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Justice Ball’s approach in Arrium required the plaintiffs to prove, to ‘a high degree of certainty’ and 
based upon known or knowable facts at the ‘snapshot date’, a prediction that the company would 
not pay a debt falling due 18 months later. In Bell Group on the other hand, Justice Owen considered 
that, to conclude solvency as at a snapshot date, it was necessary to be satisfied of a likelihood that 
the company’s resources at the snapshot date would generate the necessary cash flow to pay its 
debts as they became due and payable, including future debts. 
These differing approaches raise significant practical questions for a plaintiff (including a liquidator) 
seeking to prove actual insolvency as an essential element of its claim. For the reasons that follow, it 
is contended that the approach of Owen J in Bell Group better accords with the authorities and the 
essence of an assessment of solvency as at a ‘snapshot date’: analysing the quality and extent of the 
resources upon which a company must rely to meet its debts as and when they become due and 
payable.  With respect, I contend that the approach of Ball J in Arrium incorrectly requires a plaintiff 
to disprove a variety of conceivable possibilities that the company would find a way to meet a large, 
future maturing debt.     
The proven ‘prediction’ required by the Court in Arrium 
A key paragraph of the judgment in Arrium regarding the approach to assessing insolvency is [266] 
where Ball J stated:4  
‘In the present case, the assessment the Court must make is whether it can be said that as 
from [the snapshot date] … Arrium was unable to pay a debt falling due … [18 months later] 
... That is not a question of fact in the normal sense. It involves a prediction based on what 
was known and knowable as at [the ‘snapshot date’] … In order to make that prediction – 
that is, in order to be able to say as at [the ‘snapshot date’] … Arrium could not pay a debt 
falling due … [18 months later] – there needs to be a high degree of certainty that that 
state of affairs would come about on the basis of the facts known or knowable at the 
earlier date. Otherwise, it is not possible to say that as at [the ‘snapshot date’] … Arrium was 
unable to pay debts falling due [18 months later] ... At most all that could be said is that it 
was unlikely that Arrium would be able to pay debts falling due [18 months later] … But that 
is equivalent to saying that Arrium was likely to become insolvent, not that it was insolvent, 
from … [the ‘snapshot date’] on.’  (emphasis added) 
With respect, the approach previously taken by courts to assessing solvency has not required that a 
plaintiff prove that the company would not have paid a relevant future debt. Rather, a plaintiff 
needing to establish insolvency (to meet its case) has had to demonstrate that, on an assessment of 
the company’s debts and resources at the ‘snapshot date’, it was improbable that the company was 
able to pay its debts as they became due and payable.  
 
Granted, the assessment of a company’s debts and resources is ‘forward looking’ and the further 
into the future the assessment runs, the less certainty there may be as to whether the company’s 
resources will or will not produce the necessary cash to pay prospective (future) debts (ie, debts that 
presently exist but which are not payable until a future date).   If the future timeframe in which a 
company’s prospective debts will become due and payable is lengthy (eg, 18 months as in Arrium), 
then a court will have to use the same lengthy timeframe to consider the potential for realisation of 
assets to generate the necessary cash to meet the future debt – ie, assets that would usually be 
considered too illiquid if the assessment were looking only to the ‘reasonably immediate’ future.  
 
In Bell Group, Justice Owen decided it was appropriate to look forward 12 months from the 
‘snapshot date’ and endorsed an approach that required the Court to assess the likelihood that the 
                                                          
4 Ibid, [266]. 
Mark Wellard, UTS Law, 10 September 2021 – Submission to Insolvency Law Bulletin 
3 
 
company’s resources as at the snapshot date would generate the necessary cash to meet its debts 
including future debts:5 
 
‘I doubt that there is a “legal test” that can be applied rigidly on each and every occasion 
that a court is called upon (in effect) to reconstruct a cash flow in order to assess the 
solvency of a company at a particular time. What I have to do is decide whether or not, as 
at [the snapshot date], the relevant Bell group companies were able to pay their debts as 
the debts became due. I have to be satisfied of that on the balance of probabilities. To get 
to that point, I am obliged to look at the cash flows and decide whether each disputed item 
should be included or excluded. But does it mean that I have to be satisfied on the balance of 
probabilities as to each disputed item? I think not. The question is the weight to be given to 
the united force of all of the circumstances put together … Generally speaking, I am 
comfortable with the formulation that it is appropriate to take an item into account if it is 
likely to materialise. But I am less comfortable with a position that equates likelihood with 
the balance of probabilities. Certainly, the dictionary definitions of “likely” all include, as one 
integer, “probable”. But there are other meanings, such as “having an appearance of truth or 
fact; that looks as if it would happen, be realised or prove to be what is alleged or 
suggested”: the Oxford Dictionary. To my mind, a likelihood test does not mean that each 
and every disputed item has to be established on the balance of probabilities. But nor do I 
accept the “reasonable prospect” formulation if that is understood as sanctioning an 
overall conclusion in which none of the constituent parts are established to that level. I 
think the word “likelihood” is an apt description if it is understood … as “likely to 
materialise”, and … as a view arrived at after assessing the degrees of certainty and 
uncertainty. In the end, it probably (there is that word again) comes back to commercial 
reality.’ (emphasis added) 
 
Significantly, unlike the approach of Ball J in Arrium, the approach endorsed by Owen J in Bell Group 
does not require a plaintiff to prove to ‘a high degree of certainty’ that the company would not pay 
its future debts. The approach of Owen J in Bell Group is that a plaintiff has demonstrated that the 
company was insolvent on the snapshot date if an assessment of the company’s resources justifies a 
conclusion that, as at the ‘snapshot date’, it was improbable that the company could pay its debts as 
they became due and payable.  
 
With respect, it is the approach of Owen J in Bell Group that accords with established authority 
regarding the test for insolvency required by s 95A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Section 95A 
provides that a company that is not solvent is insolvent.  The essential question is: ‘as at the 
snapshot date, was it more probable than not that the company could meet its debts as they became 
due and payable?’ If the answer is ‘no’, then the company was insolvent on the snapshot date.   
 
Insolvent vs ‘likely to become insolvent’ 
 
In Arrium Ball J (in the extract quoted above) indicated that it ‘could be said’ that the company was 
unlikely to be able to pay the relevant future debts, but that this simply meant that the company 
was ‘likely to become insolvent’ – not that it was insolvent – at the ‘snapshot date’. Again, the 
reasons for judgment of Owen J in Bell Group call into question this distinction between ‘actual’ 
insolvency on the snapshot date and ‘likely’ insolvency at a future date.  
 
                                                          
5 The Bell Group Ltd (ACN 008 666 993) (in liq) and Ors v Westpac Banking Corporation (ACN 007 457 141) and 
Ors (No 9) [2008] WASC 239 at [1097] to [1102].  Owen J’s conclusion of insolvency on the relevant date was 
not challenged on appeal: Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2012] WASCA 157 at 
[917] per Lee AJA and [2708] and [3195] per Carr AJA. 
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In Bell Group Justice Owen suggested that the term ‘would inevitably become insolvent’ is inept 
insofar as it is used to describe a debtor’s ability to pay a future debt from present resources:6  
 
‘Take a hypothetical example. A company has one asset, namely $2m in cash on deposit, and 
it has a debt of $3m that it is paying off at the rate of $1m per month on the last day of each 
month. Assume that the company has no capacity to borrow money (so cannot increase the 
asset base of $2m) and has no other income or source of funds. It seems to me that as at the 
snapshot date and looking 3 months ahead, the entity is insolvent. This is because it is known 
that in the third month the final instalment on the debt repayment schedule cannot be met. I 
do not think it would be correct to say that for the first 2 months the entity is solvent because 
it can meet the instalments due in that period, but that it would inevitably become insolvent 
in the third month.  
 
The problems are illustrated by a further example. Using the same basic figures, add a 
further asset, namely, a piece of real estate that is readily saleable within a three-month 
period for a net return of somewhere between $0.75m and $1.25m. A value judgment would 
have to be made as to whether the property would fetch $1m or more. If it would, the 
entity is solvent. If it would not, the entity is insolvent. In terms of the test that is relevant 
for this case, I doubt it would be correct to say that the entity would inevitably become 
insolvent unless the property could be sold within 3 months and for a net return exceeding 
$1m. If the view were to be formed that the property could not be sold within 3 months or 
that it would not reach $1m, it would thereupon be insolvent.’ (emphasis added) 
 
On a ‘snapshot date’, a debtor is either able to pay its future debts from its resources or it is not able 
to do so. If it is assessed to be unlikely that the debtor can pay its existing prospective (future) debts 
(upon examination of the debtor’s resources) then the debtor is insolvent, not ‘likely to become 
insolvent’ at a later date.  
 
The requirement of an objective assessment of the quality of a debtor’s resources – ie, the 
probability or likelihood that a company’s resources as at the snapshot date could generate the 
necessary cash to pay the company’s debts (including future debts) – has been endorsed in 
numerous authorities including:  
 
• Sandell v Porter:7 In this landmark High Court decision Barwick CJ stated that ‘no doubt 
experts may speak as to the likelihood of any of the debtor's assets or capacities yielding 
ready cash in sufficient time to meet the debts as they fall due’; 
 
• Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd v Miller:8 The Court assessed that, as at the snapshot date, 
there was a low likelihood of the recovery of a large amount of outstanding accounts which 
justified their exclusion from the solvency assessment; 
 
• Pearce v Gulmohar:9 Surplus inventory excluded from the solvency assessment due to an 
absence of evidence of a prospective realisation program; 
 
• Treloar Constructions Pty Ltd v McMillan:10 A ‘bare possibility of funding’ was not, ‘as a 
matter of commercial reality’, considered to be an available resource to sustain solvency. 
                                                          
6 Ibid, [1145] to [1149]. 
7 Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666. 
8 Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699. 
9 Pearce v Gulmohar [2017] FCA 660. 
10 Treloar Constructions Pty Ltd v McMillan (2017) 120 ACSR 130, [2017] NSWCA 72, [121]. 
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The NSW Court of Appeal also rejected a criticism of the relevant insolvency practitioner’s 
expert report – that insufficient regard had been given to a realisable franchise – because 
‘there was no evidence that the sale of the franchise was ever actually contemplated.11 The 
Court also stated that the plaintiff’s ‘legal onus to prove insolvency … carried with it the 
evidentiary onus of proof sufficient to establish insolvency or at least to establish matters 
from which insolvency could be inferred at each of the relevant dates.’12 
 
• Quin v Vlahos:13 In this recent decision, the Victorian Court of Appeal held there was 
insufficient evidence of alternative financial support (including degree of commitment) from 
a director’s wife to support a finding of solvency. The Court also confirmed that ‘whilst the 
legal onus to prove insolvency rests with the party alleging insolvency, the party alleging that 
an inference that a company was insolvent should not be drawn because third-party funds 
were available to it bears an evidentiary onus on this issue’;14 
 
• Chan v First Strategic Development Corporation Ltd (in liq):15 The Queensland Court of 
Appeal endorsed the proposition that ‘there [must] be a degree of assuredness that the 
financial support will be forthcoming and at such a level that one could say the company 
was able to pay its debts as and when they fall due, rather than being possibly able to do 
so. Just as a conclusion that the relevant financial support does not have to be absolutely 
certain in order to be sufficient to meet the test … equally the financial support does not 
have to be absolutely uncertain in order to be insufficient to qualify.’ (emphasis added) 
  
Ball J’s approach in Arrium relied at least in part on the High Court’s decision in Insurance 
Commissioner v Associated Dominions Assurance Society Proprietary Limited (1953) 89 CLR 78, a case 
in which the High Court concluded that an insurance company was insolvent because it was ‘highly 
probable’ – if not ‘practically certain’ – that within some seven years it would be ‘unable to 
discharge in full claims under maturing policies’. However, nowhere in that decision did the High 
Court state that a company must be characterised as able to pay its debts (including future debts) 
unless and until it is ‘certain’ that it cannot do so.  That High Court decision did not endorse a test or 
necessary standard of ‘certain’ inability to pay future debts in order to sustain a conclusion of 
insolvency; rather, on the evidence in that case, the Court was satisfied to a degree of certainty that 
the company’s assets were insufficient to meet its future debts.   
 
Why a ‘balance of probabilities’ approach matters 
 
No opinion is expressed on whether the evidence in Arrium would have sustained a different 
conclusion on the question of solvency according to the ‘balance of probabilities’ approach preferred 
by Owen J in Bell Group and other authorities. However, it is concerning to see the Court in Arrium 
set a test or threshold standard of ‘certainty’ that effectively requires a plaintiff to disprove the 
possibility of a company’s debts being paid (or prove to a high degree of certainty that a future debt 
will not be paid) rather than applying the established standards of likelihood and probability to 
assess solvency under s 95A. 
 
                                                          
11 Ibid, [144]. 
12 Ibid, [142]. 
13 Quin v Vlahos [2021] VSCA 205. 
14 The Court cited as authority for this proposition Treloar Constructions Pty Ltd v McMillan (2017) 120 ACSR 
130, 86 [142]–[143], [2017] NSWCA 72. 
15 Chan v First Strategic Development Corporation Ltd (in liq) [2015] QCA 28 at [43] per Morrison JA (with 
whom Gotterson and Boddice JJA agreed). 
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Creditor protections in our corporations and insolvency laws, including the s 588G duty to prevent 
insolvent trading and voidable transaction provisions in Part 5.7B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 
will not operate as intended if the state of a company’s insolvency is denied for so long as there 
remains a mere possibility or more than remote prospect of the company generating the necessary 
cash to meet large, prospective debt obligations. 
 
An English decision that resonates for its focus on the potential prejudice to creditors where 
insolvency is denied so long as there remains a ‘more than fanciful’ (but unlikely) prospect of paying 
future debts is the UK High Court’s decision in Re Cheyne Finance plc.16 The Court was required to 
assess whether a company was insolvent for the purposes of triggering a different distribution 
regime pursuant to a security trust deed under which receivers had been appointed and the 
company’s investments were being realised. The Court stated:17 
 
‘It is clear from … the Australian decisions that in an environment shorn of any balance sheet 
test for insolvency, cash flow or commercial insolvency is not to be ascertained by a slavish 
focus only on debts due as at the relevant date. Such a blinkered review will, in some cases, 
fail to see that a momentary inability to pay is only the result of a temporary lack of liquidity 
soon to be remedied, and in other cases fail to see that due to an endemic shortage of 
working capital a company is on any commercial view insolvent, even though it may 
continue to pay its debts for the next few days, weeks or even months before an inevitable 
failure.’ (emphasis added) 
 
The UK High Court then articulated the merit of a ‘balance of probabilities’ approach to assessing a 
company’s ability to pay its debts (including future debts) as at a snapshot date:18  
 
‘By contrast with a state of mind requisite for a finding of wrongful trading—that is, 
knowledge that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into 
insolvent liquidation—which is used as a test for directors’ personal liability, the insolvency 
event test is imposed upon the receivers in the trust deed to determine the time at which run-
off by fiduciaries with pay as you go is replaced by a pari passu distribution by the same 
fiduciaries in accordance with the payment priority. If that change is postponed for as long 
as there is more than a fanciful prospect of payment in full, its consequences may work 
grave prejudice to senior creditors with later maturing debts out of all proportion to the 
prejudice to early maturing creditors of becoming subject to pari passu distribution of assets 
realised to produce best value rather than early cash. The fact that the market for Cheyne’s 
investment portfolio may go up as well as down may well make it hard to say that the 
prospect of payment in full is only fanciful, even though unlikely.  Being satisfied on the 
balance of probabilities is, in my judgment, typical of the standards on which commercial 
fiduciaries are accustomed to act when making important business decisions in the best 
interests of their beneficiaries.’ (emphasis added) 
 
Conclusion: It is not ‘commercial reality’ to deny insolvency when it is unlikely that a company can 
pay its future debts from its present resources 
 
A ‘balance of probabilities’ assessment of the sufficiency of a debtor’s resources to meet its debts, 
including future debts, better accords with the notion of ‘commercial reality’ than does denying a 
state of insolvency until such time as it is ‘certain’ that a company cannot pay its debts.  The 
question of insolvency is one of fact and the sufficiency of a debtor’s resources should be assessed 
                                                          
16 Re Cheyne Finance plc [2007] EWHC 2402 (Ch) [2008] 2 All ER 987. 
17 Ibid, [51] per Briggs J. 
18 Ibid, [75] – [76]. 
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according to the balance of probabilities and likelihood, not by reference to notions of ‘reasonable 
prospects’ or ‘possibilities’ (let alone mere hope).  
 
If the test for insolvency of a company with large future debt commitments is the approach 
enunciated by Ball J in Arrium, why did directors ever need a statutory safe harbour from the s 588G 
duty to prevent insolvent trading?  Perhaps hope is a strategy after all. 
 
We await with interest any news of an appeal.  
 
 
 
 
 
